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PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: WHOSE
LIFE IS IT ANYWAY?
Catherine L. Bjorck
I. INTRODUCTION
HE cultural taboos over persons committing suicide due to ill health
have been broken,' and "Americans are taking death into their own
hands."'2 Many people today believe not only that suicide should be
accepted for those who are physically suffering and who wish to end their
lives, but also that physicians should be permitted to assist in the suicide
process. 3 In a recent New York Times-CBS poll, fifty-three percent of re-
spondents agreed that "doctors should be allowed to assist a severely ill per-
son to commit suicide."14 The growing attraction to the assisted suicide
movement reflects the idea that "doctors and hospitals have gone too far in
their care of the terminally ill."' 5 Over the past fifty years, society has
watched the medical community prolong the dying process, a process that is
frequently marked by intolerable pain and indignity. 6 Many individuals no
longer consider life at any cost desirable, and are increasingly unwilling to
prolong the dying process. 7 While concentrating on lengthening life at any
cost, the medical community has created a backlash of suffering individuals
who want to end their lives. 8 One public opinion poll found that sixty-eight
percent of respondents believed that "people dying of an incurable painful
disease should be allowed to end their lives before the disease runs its
course."9 This poll reflects the desire of Americans for the establishment of
physician-assisted suicide as an acceptable alternative to suffering so that
each individual is able to maintain control over his or her own life and death.
Physician-assisted suicide involves difficult questions of ethics and law.
1. Norman K. Denzin, The Suicide Machine, SOCIETY, July/Aug. 1992, at 7, 8.
2. Id. (quoting C. Wright Mills). "A self-managed death is the only real symbolic vio-
lence [that Americans] can wage against the impersonal, structural violence of the postmodern
movement." Id. Mills correctly predicted that this postmodern movement would be charac-
terized by "the irrational rationalization and bureaucratization of everyday life." Id.
3. Id. at 9.
4. Elizabeth W. Markson, Moral Dilemmas, SOCIETY, July/Aug. 1992, at 4.
5. Denzin, supra note 1, at 9.
6. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Decisions
Near the End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229, 2229 (1992).
7. Id.
8. Prosecutor Suspends Effort to Try Suicide Doctor, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 24,
1992 (quoting Dr. Kevorkian).
9. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 6, at 2229.
10. William J. Winslade & Kyriakos S. Markides, Assisted Suicide and Professional Re-
sponsibilities, SOCIETY, July/Aug. 1992, at 16.
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Despite this unresolved legal and moral controversy, some physicians openly
engage in assisting their patients to die. 1' For example, Dr. Timothy E.
Quill, a physician from New York, admitted that he had assisted a termi-
nally ill patient in taking her life. 12 Dr. Quill wrote a prescription for barbi-
turates for one of his patients, knowing that she intended to use the drugs to
commit suicide. He confessed that he also told her the dosage necessary to
commit suicide. Referring to the aid he provided his patient, Dr. Quill
stated: "I wrote the prescription with an uneasy feeling about the boundaries
I was exploring-spiritual, legal, professional, and personal. Yet I also felt
strongly that I was setting her free ... to maintain dignity and control on
her own terms."' 13 Dr. Quill's statement reflects the conflict in our society
between the desire to grant people full autonomy and dignity, and the desire
to comply with current legal and moral standards.
Despite Dr. Quill's confession and New York law - under which individ-
uals convicted of assisted suicide can be sent to prison for five to ten years-
a grand jury decided not to indict Dr. Quill. 14 This grand jury decision, in
conjuriction with the public opinion surveys, seems to point toward ultimate
legalization of the practice.15 Acceptable legal boundaries in physician-as-
sisted suicide must be clarified in light of the increasing number of elderly
and terminally ill people in the United States. 16 By the year 2000, persons
over the age of sixty-five will comprise the largest age group in the United
States. 17 Suicide is one of the projected leading causes of death for this
group. 18 Suicide is also projected to be a leading cause of death for the
chronically ill, including those dying from AIDS. 19 These statistics, along
with growing public concern, demand that new laws be formulated allowing
physicians to assist patients in committing suicide without fearing the legal
and professional consequences.
Physicians play an important role in assisted suicide because many indi-
viduals do not have the medical knowledge and skills to successfully end
their own lives. Marjorie Wantz, a woman suffering from a painful pelvic
disease, tried to kill herself three different times. 20 She said that she "tried
everything, short of a gun."12 1 Finally, she convinced Dr. Jack Kevorkian to
use his knowledge and resources to help her end her life peacefully. 22 When
11. Id. at 17.
12. Timothy E. Quill, M.D., Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Mak-
ing, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 691, 693 (1991).
13. Id.
14. Robert J. Blendon et al., Should Physicians Aid Their Patients in Dying?. The Public
Perspective, 267 JAMA 2658, 2658 (1992).
15. Id.




20. Pamela Warrick, Suicides's Partner, Is Jack Kevorkian an Angel of Mercy, or is He a
Killer, as Some Critics Charge?" "Society is making Me Dr. Death, "He says. "Why Can't They
See? I'm Dr. Life?," L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, at El.
21. Id.
22. Id. Dr. Jack Kevorkian grew up in Pontiac, Michigan as a first-generation Armenian
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medical professionals are prohibited from aiding suffering individuals, it is
inevitable that many will attempt to end their lives on their own. The lack of
medical knowledge on the part of these individuals could result in botched
attempts, and the suffering person may actually worsen his or her condition.
Further, only a handful of people say they would feel comfortable asking
relatives or friends to assist them in committing suicide, and most people say
that even if they were asked to provide such assistance, they would not per-
sonally assist a relative or friend in ending his or her life.23 When Sherry
Miller, a woman suffering from multiple sclerosis, decided to end her life,
her brother respected her judgment but "could not put the needle in her
arm."' 24 Suffering patients, such as Sherry Miller, will turn to their doctors
for help and "the burden to act ... will ultimately rest with the attending
physician."'2 5 Legalizing physician-assisted suicide will allow terminally ill
and suffering patients to end their lives somewhat autonomously, with the
dignity each human being deserves.
II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN ASSISTED SUICIDE AND
EUTHANASIA
In proceeding with this analysis, the distinction between euthanasia and
physician-assisted suicide must be made. The two forms of death differ pri-
marily in the degree of the physician's participation. 26 Euthanasia occurs
when a physician performs the action which ends the patient's life, such as
giving a lethal injection.2 7 Assisted suicide occurs when a physician pro-
vides the means and information necessary for the patient to perform the
life-ending action, such as giving a prescription for sleeping pills and infor-
mation about the lethal dose.28
Doctors and patients, alike, prefer physician-assisted suicide over euthana-
sia for both ethical and legal reasons. 29 Physician-assisted suicide is "an
ethically more attractive option" because it affords the patient a more auton-
omous way of ending his or her life than does euthanasia. 30 The one who
actually performs the life-ending act is the patient. 3' Thus patients have
"the added protection of being able to change their minds" and abort the
suicide at the last minute. 32 Physician-assisted suicide is legally preferable to
euthanasia because it destroys the causation factor necessary for the physi-
in a highly traditional and conservative family. He is devoted to helping suffering patients end
their lives, but never charges his patients for his assistance. Id.
23. Blendon, supra note 14, at 2662.
24. Warrick, supra note 20, at El.
25. Blendon, supra note 14, at 2662.
26. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 6, at 2229.
27. Id. This comment uses the word "euthanasia" in the same way that some scholars use
the phrase "active euthanasia" (as opposed to "passive euthanasia").
28. Id.
29. See id. at 2232.
30. Id.
31. John J. Conley, Masks of Autonomy, SOCIETY, July/Aug. 1992, at 11.
32. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 6, at 2232.
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cian to be held criminally liable for homicide. 33 Since the patient actually
causes the death, the physician is absolved from criminal liability in those
states that do not have specific statutes prohibiting assisted suicide.34
III. THE REASON FOR PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE:
INDIVIDUAL CASES WHERE SUICIDE WAS THE
"RATIONAL" ALTERNATIVE
The most grievous problem with the current illegality of physician-as-
sisted suicide is that some terminally-ill people are forced to suffer horribly.
Persons with debilitating and painful diseases are forced to remain living,
frequently against their will. The lack of a choice between a painful life or a
peaceful death strips them of their personal dignity. The following case
studies illustrate four of the many situations in which individuals are in such
pain that they view death as the only rational choice.
During the two and a half years before she took her life, Marjorie Wantz
was tormented by chronic pelvic pain.3 5 After ten operations, doctors still
could not determine the cause of her pain. 36 The pain made it almost impos-
sible for her to walk, and she was unable to sleep for more than a couple of
hours at a time.37 The constant suffering drove this mother of two to at-
tempt suicide three times, yet she was unsuccessful in each attempt.38 She
needed the aid of a medical professional in order to end her life. She plead
with Dr. Kevorkian many times to help her commit suicide through the use
of his suicide machine. 39 Dr. Kevorkian chose to help her, but not until her
doctors said there was no hope of recovery from the disease or relief from
33. See generally William Douglas, 'Dr. Death'to Face Murder Charges, NEWSDAY (City
Ed.), Feb. 29, 1992, at 2.
34. Id.
35. D'Arcy Jenish, Death Defined, MACLEAN'S, Aug. 26, 1991, at 40.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Warrick, supra note 20, at El. " 'I want to die,' says Marjorie Wantz. 'I've tried [to
kill] myself three different times ... tried everything, short of a gun. This time,' she says and
looks warmly at Kevorkian, 'it will be done right.' " Id. (demonstrating the problems of
botched suicide attempts that can occur if aid of physicians in the suicide process is not
allowed).
39. Jenish, supra note 35, at 41. Dr. Kevorkian wanted to create a suicide machine that
would allow a rapid, serene, and sure death. DR. JACK KEVORKIAN, PRESCRIPTION - MEDI-
CIDE: THE GOODNESS OF PLANNED DEATH 208 (1991). He also wanted the machine t4self-
administer an injection in order to avoid then current laws that subjected doctors to voluntary-
manslaughter charges for killing patients by injection. Id. The self-administering nature of
this machine also reduced the "moral vulnerability" of the assisting person. Dr. Kevorkian
created a suicide machine with these qualifications, which he called the "Mercitron." The
Mercitron has an I.V. drip of normal saline solution with a special mechanism which is acti-
vated by the patient when he or she presses a hair-trigger switch. The special mechanism
performs several functions. The first three are simultaneous: the saline drip is discontinued,
there is a rapid infusion of a large dose of thiopental through tubing connected to the I.V.
needle, and a timer is activated. One minute later the timer starts a rapid infusion of concen-
trated potassium chloride solution to flow concurrently with the thiopental through the I.V.
needle. The timer also turns off the device, but the solutions continue to flow. The patient is
put into a deep coma within 20 to 30 seconds after the thiopental solution is administered, and
the potassium chloride paralyzes the heart muscle within several minutes. Id. at 209. The
patient will have had a painless heart attack while in deep sleep, and death will probably occur
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the pain. 4° When Marjorie did finally end her life with the help of the sui-
cide machine, she escaped the suffering associated with a slow and painful
death. 4
Lois Hawes had severe lung cancer which had spread to her brain. 42 She
had been diagnosed as terminal, and she "feared lapsing into a coma and
confronting her family with the decision to withdraw life-support sys-
tems." 43 Lois was experiencing extreme physical pain, and she turned to Dr.
Kevorkian for help in ending her life.44 Physicians treating Lois showed
their acceptance of her decision by meeting with Dr. Kevorkian and discuss-
ing her case. 45 These physicians cooperated with Dr. Kevorkian by sharing
medical records and consulting with him on Lois's physical and mental con-
dition.46 In a videotaped statement filmed just before she took her life, Lois
tried to maintain a dignified facade, but she groaned involuntarily from pain
and moaned as she spoke faltering sentences about her wish to die.47 Both
her physicians' and Dr. Kevorkian's respect for her decision to end her life
allowed Lois to do so in peace and on her own terms.
Marcella Lawrence, a retired nurse, suffered from heart disease, emphy-
sema, osteoporosis, and a failing liver.48 Her extreme pain led her to the
decision that she was ready to die, and she turned to Dr. Kevorkian for
help. 49 Dr. Kevorkian, however, encouraged her not to give up. Marcella
then went from specialist to specialist in an attempt to alleviate some of her
torturous pain, but nothing would take it away. She finally felt she had suf-
fered too much and she was ready to end her life. Dr. Kevorkian-recogniz-
ing Marcella's excruciating pain, the futility of medicine to alleviate that
pain, and her readiness to die-assisted her in ending her life.50
Diane (last name unpublished) was a woman with leukemia who suffered
all of the traditional symptoms: bone pain, weakness, fatigue, and fevers.5 '
Diane was extremely fearful of a lingering death. When the time came, she
wanted to take her life in the least painful way possible. She consulted with
her physician, Dr. Timothy Quill, about how she could attain this wish. Dr.
Quill acknowledged and explored her request, but felt that the request was
out of the realm of currently accepted medical practice and more than he
within three to six minutes after the device is activated. Janet Adkins was the first patient who
used the Mercitron. Id. at 210.
40. Jenish, supra note 35, at 41.
41. Douglas, supra note 33, at 2.
42. Robert Ourlian & Elizabeth Atkins, Supporters of 'Dr. Death'See New Era in Assisted
Suicides, Gannett News Service, Sept. 28, 1992.
43. Id.
44. U.S. "Suicide Doctor" Assists Fifth Death, REUTERS, Sept. 26, 1992.
45. Ourlian & Atkins, supra note 42.
46. U.S. "Suicide Doctor" Assists Fifth Death, supra note 44.
47. Ourlian & Atkins, supra note 42.
48. Michael Abramowitz, Kevorkian Aids in 2 More Suicides; Michigan Governor Signs
Bill Making Practice a Felony, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1992, at A2; Suicide Doctor Helps Two
More End Lives, REUTERS, Dec. 15, 1992.
49. Warrick, supra note 20, at El.
50. Id.
51. Quill, supra note 12, at 693.
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could offer or promise. Dr. Quill, however, soon came to realize that Di-
ane's fearful preoccupation with a lingering death would interfere with her
ability to get the most out of the time she had left with her family. It was
"extraordinarily important" to Diane that 'she retain control over her life.
Diane again met with her doctor and requested a prescription for barbitu-
rates. Dr. Quill believed that the security of having the barbiturates avail-
able to commit suicide, if the time came, would leave her secure enough to
live fully and concentrate on the present. Diane was not despondent during
this time; rather, she was making deep, personal connections with her family
and friends. Dr. Quill wrote the prescription and made sure she knew the
proper amount for a lethal dose.
When the time came for Diane to choose, she chose to die rather than to
continue living in pain. Her family had no doubts about the course she had
chosen or about their cooperation. They were content with the knowledge
that she had died by her own choice.
Marjorie, Lois, Marcella, and Diane were each fortunate to find a doctor
who respected their beliefs enough to give them the autonomy to choose how
and when to end their lives. Many physicians would not have been so will-
ing to help a suffering patient because of a fear of the legal and professional
consequences. Although it is commendable that Dr. Quill and Dr. Kevor-
kian wanted to help these women, the doctors' actions need to be accompa-
nied by strict regulation in order to insure that patients are not coerced into
committing suicide by doctors, relatives, or friends. Legislation allowing
physician-assisted suicide would permit individuals to successfully take their
lives with the help of a medical professional but would also provide proce-
dural safeguards to prevent abuse of the practice.
IV. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
A. CRITICISMS OF LEGALIZING PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
Opponents of physician-assisted suicide fear that legalizing the practice
would make it a definite option for doctors to kill their patients.5 2 The op-
tion, however, is not, and should not be, left to the doctor. Rather, the pa-
tient decides to end his or her life and actually performs the life-ending act.
The doctor is just a medical professional with the knowledge and resources
to aid a patient endeavoring to end his or her life. The physician, after deter-
mining that the patient meets a rigid and specific set of criteria, would assist
the patient by providing only the means of suicide. The physician, however,
would not commit the final act. 53 The patient controls the dying process.
Furthermore, the legalization of physician-assisted suicide, alone, does not
mean that most people would choose that option. Those who are opposed to
the practice may of course choose to live out their natural lives, but the right
52. Joyce Price, Michigan Committee Approves Assisted-Suicide Bill, WASH. TIMES, Oct.
8, 1992, at A5.
53. Gale Scott, Suicide: A Kinder, Gentler Way to Die?, NEWSDAY, Dec. 2, 1992, at 89.
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to choose between life and death is important to each individual and should
not be limited.
Another argument presented against legalizing physician-assisted suicide
is that individuals do not need to fear excessive pain as they face their final
days because "[t]he medical profession is well-equipped to provide proper
medications to keep us comfortable, and allow us to complete our earthly
journey in grace-filled peace."' 54 While modern medicine is well-equipped to
slow the dying process, modern medicine is not always equally able to stop
unbearable pain. 55 Dr. Timothy Quill stated that even "[iun the face of ex-
cellent palliative care, hospice care, severe suffering still occurs."'56 The sto-
ries of Marjorie Wantz, Lois Hawes, Marcella Lawrence, and others
mentioned throughout this comment, all attest to the fact that medical tech-
nology cannot always alleviate physical pain.57 Although these persons suf-
fered from different diseases, they all shared one thing in common: severe
pain and a fierce desire to end their lives with dignity.
Another criticism of legalizing physician-assisted suicide is that it will cre-
ate a slippery slope which will disrupt the doctor-patient relationship. 58
Critics fear that physician-assisted suicide would bring into question motiva-
tions of the physician. 59 The patient, however, is the one who has control
over his own death. No additional power is put in the hands of the physi-
cian. 6° The physician serves merely as an advisor and a provider of the
means by which the patient can end his or her life.
Another danger which critics fear is that such a change in policy will lead
to a societal view that some lives are dispensable. 61 Critics contend that "the
day may come when ill patients ... will be dosed with poison without their
consent, to speed the inevitable death and save money."' 62 Strict safeguards
on the system, however, would prevent such a possibility. The voluntary
nature of assisted suicide and the professionalism of physicians would also
help prevent this slippery slope. 63 The very basis of physician-assisted sui-
cide is that individuals make the decision to either continue to live or to die.
The choice is not in the hands of the doctor, family members, or the govern-
ment; rather, it belongs to each individual. Since the decision to end one's
54. Cardinal Mahony Urges Defeat of Euthanasia Proposition, UPI, Oct. 30, 1992. Cardi-
nal Roger Mahony urged his 3.4 million member flock to pray for the defeat of an initiative in
California that would legalize physician-assisted suicide, calling the initiative unnecessary and
dangerous. Id.
55. See Paul Jacobs, Quietly, Doctors Already Help Terminal Patients Die, Ethics: A West-
side Physician Tells of Two "Caring Acts. "Prop. 161, to Legalize Such Aid, Divides the Medical
Field, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1992, at Al.
56. California: Health Propositions - Do They Have a Future?, HEALTH LINE, Nov. 5,
1992.
57. Another Suicide Aided by Controversial Doctor, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27, 1992, at C4; see
also Abramowitz, supra note 48, at A2; B.D. Colen, Gender Question in Assisted Suicide,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 25, 1992, at 17; Ourlian & Atkins, supra note 42.
58. California: Health Propositions, supra note 56.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. What Role for Doctors in Dying?, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 2, 1992, at C12.
62. Id.
63. What is the "Good Death"?, EcONOMIST, July 20, 1991, at 24.
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life with assistance belongs solely to the suffering individual, the patient's life
would not become dispensable at the request of anyone else.
B. SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ABUSE
As noted above, critics of assisted suicide fear that its legalization will lead
to rampant abuses. 64 When considering assisted suicide as a public policy,
society must insure that proper safeguards are in place to prevent potential
abuse. 65 Three considerations should dominate the analysis of safeguarding
policy: "1) Does the action enhance the dignity of the person? 2) Is it the
result of the person's self-determination? 3) Does it reflect compassion for
the person and others?" 66
Public policy should insure that only mature, mentally competent adults
with acceptable reasons are allowed to make the decision to commit assisted
suicide.67 Statutes should be formulated which would specify rigid guide-
lines for the allowance of physician-assisted suicide. The decision to termi-
nate life should be made by the patient and should be accepted only after the
patient has undergone mandatory psychiatric examinations, has been coun-
seled on alternatives, and has explored all options. 68 If the patient still main-
tains his or her desire to commit suicide with assistance, a suitable waiting
period should be required in order to avoid hasty decisions. 69 At that point,
a court hearing should be held so that a judge can assure that the decision to
die is a result of the patient's wish and not the result of pressure from others.
Such requirements would prevent the mentally unstable, the temporarily de-
pressed, or the immature, from ending their lives. 70 A system with these
types of safeguards would prevent abuse while allowing individuals who an-
ticipate a life of misery to choose death with dignity. 7 1
V. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT OF
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
A. SURVEY OF THE LAWS REGARDING PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
Current American law provides little guidance as to who has the right to
decide whether a life should be ended and what the safeguards surrounding
this decision should be. 72 Some states carry laws on their books which posit
that a person who assists a suicide is guilty of manslaughter, 73 another state
calls assisted suicide "murder, ' 74 and others are completely silent on the
64. See William McCord, Dignity, Choice, and Care, SOCIETY, July/Aug. 1992, at 20-23.
65. Id. at 23.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 24.
68. What Role for Doctors in Dying?, supra note 61, at C12.
69. McCord, supra note 64, at 24.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 20.
73. Id. (The states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, and Oregon).
74. Suicide Doctor Helps Two More End Lives, supra note 48. (Michigan Governor John
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issue. 5 The laws of many states allow one to commit suicide legally, yet
prohibit aid by another in completing the act. 76 This divergence of Ameri-
can laws regarding assisted suicide has led to confusion and disorder.
At this time, twenty-five states in America have statutes expressly prohib-
iting one person from assisting in another's suicide. 77 The statutes of the
remaining states do not legislatively provide for the act of assisted suicide. 78
This omission has led to confusion over how to deal with the situation when
it occurs.
For example, in Michigan, suicide machine inventor Dr. Jack Kevorkian
has to date assisted seventeen ill persons in committing suicide. 79 Although
Engler has said that physician-assisted suicide is "murder" and vows to prosecute those who
give such assistance. Id.
75. McCord, supra note 64, at 20 (The states are Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, North Caro-
lina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.).
76. George P. Smith II, All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational
Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275, 307 (1989)
(citing GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 530, 531 (1978)) (The states
are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Kansas,
Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mex-
ico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, and
Wisconsin.).
77. ALASKA STAT. § !1.41.120(a)(2) (1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103A.3
(1991); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(2) (Michie 1992); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (Deering
1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104(1)(b) (1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-56(a)(2) (1993);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (1987 & Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 1992);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204 (West 1992);
MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (1987 & Supp. 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1991); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:4 (1991); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:11-6 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (Michie 1992);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (Consol. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-04 (1991); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, .§ 813 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.125(l)(b) (1991); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 2505(B) (1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-16-37 (1992); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.08 (West 1989); WIS. STAT. § 940.12 (1989-1990).
78. These states include Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina,
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Vir-
ginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
79. Another Suicide Aided by Controversial Doctor, supra note 57, at C4; Abramowitz,
supra note 48, at A2; Ourlian & Atkins, supra note 42; Colen, supra note 57, at 17; Why Dr.
Kevorkian Was Called In, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1993, at A16; Kevorkian Assists in Suicides of
Two Elderly Cancer Victims, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1993, at A14; Kevorkian Helps Woman in
"Medicide'" His Twelfth, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1993, at A19; Kevorkian Assists in Thirteenth
Suicide Case, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1993, at A16; Kevorkian Aids in Two More Suicides, Total
is at Fifteen, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1993, at AI0; Kevorkian Faces Charge That Will Test
Suicide Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 18, 1993 at Al. The seventeen individuals
whom Kevorkian assisted in ending their lives are Janet Adkins, 54, of Portland, Oregon, who
suffered from Alzheimers; Marjorie Wantz, 58, of Sodus, Michigan, who suffered from a pelvic
disease; Sherry Miller, 43, of Roseville, Michigan, who suffered from multiple sclerosis; Susan
Williams, 52, of Clawson, Michigan, who suffered from multiple sclerosis; Lois Hawes, 52, of
Warren, Michigan, who suffered from terminal lung cancer; Catherine A. Andreyev, 45, of
Moon Township, Pennsylvania, who suffered from cancer; Marguerite Tate, 70, of Auburn
Hills, Michigan, who suffered from Lou Gehrig's disease; Marcella Lawrence, 67, of Mt.
Clemens, Michigan, who suffered from heart disease, emphysema, and a failing liver; Jack
Miller, 53, of Detroit, Michigan, who suffered from bone cancer and emphysema; Stanley Ball,
82, of Leland, Michigan, who suffered from pancreatic cancer; Mary Biernat, 73, of Crown
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Michigan law did not expressly prohibit such actions, the state charged Dr.
Kevorkian with murder. 80 An examination of the way in which Michigan
handled Dr. Kevorkian's actions shows that states need to expressly address
physician-assisted suicide.
In 1990, Dr. Kevorkian helped Janet Adkins, an Alzheimer's patient, kill
herself.8 ' Dr. Kevorkian provided Janet with a suicide machine and ex-
plained to her how to use it.82 The essence of this suicide machine "is its
ability to permit an individual to intentionally self-administer a lethal dose of
drugs." 83 Dr. Kevorkian was charged with first-degree murder for his role
in assisting Janet in ending her life.84 In regard to such charges, Dr. Kevor-
kian has said that he is a "physician, unconditionally dedicated to the honor-
able and ethical practice of alleviating hopelessly irremediable physical
suffering."8' 5 A Michigan judge subsequently dismissed the charges because
there was no law prohibiting the action.8 6 The judge, however, did order
Dr. Kevorkian not to assist any more suicides.8 7
Then in October 1991, Dr. Kevorkian helped Marjorie Wantz and Sherry
Miller, two women who suffered from painful and debilitating diseases, end
their lives.88 In these cases, Dr. Kevorkian also provided each woman with
a mechanical suicide device he had invented but which the patients activated
themselves. 89 In spite of the prior dismissal of charges against Dr. Kevor-
kian in the Janet Adkins case, another Michigan judge ruled that Dr. Kevor-
kian must again stand trial on murder charges. 90 The judge said that it was
unclear who had actually activated the two suicide devices, claiming that the
causation factor was a question of fact for the jury to determine at trial. 91
Even the prosecution, however, conceded that the patients themselves had
Point, Indiana, who suffered from breast cancer; Elaine Goldbaum, 47, of Detroit, Michigan,
who suffered from multiple sclerosis; Hugh Gale, 70, of Detroit, Michigan, who suffered from
emphysema and congestive heart disease; Jonathon Grenz, 44, of Costa Mesa, California, who
suffered from throat cancer; Martha Ruwart, 40, of San Diego, California, who suffered from
both intestinal and ovarian cancer; Ronald Mansur, 54, of Southfield, Michigan, who suffered
from lung and bone cancer; and Thomas Hyde, 30, of Wayne County, Michigan, who suffered
from Lou Gehrig's disease. Id. at 413.
80. Douglas, supra note 33, at 2.
81. Id.
82. Jesse C. Vivian, Drugs, R.PH.s, Death; Should Pharmacists Dispense Drugs When
They Will be Used for Suicide? Includes Case of Jack Kevorkian Legal/Ethical Trends, 135
MED. ECON. COMPANY 55, 55 (1991).
83. Id.; see supra note 39 for an in-depth discussion of the autonomous nature of the
machine's use.




88. Edward Walsh, Judge Orders Kevorkian to Trial in Two Deaths. Confrontation Set Up
on Right-to-Die Issue, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 1992, at A3.
89. Id. Sherry Miller died by inhaling carbon monoxide through a machine similar in
principle to the Mercitron. The patient places a mask over his or her face. The mask is con-
nected by plastic tubing to a canister of carbon monoxide. When the patient pulls the clip off
the plastic tubing, the carbon monoxide flows into the mask which leads to sleep and then
death. Why Dr. Kevorkian Was Called In, supra note 79, at A16.
90. Douglas, supra note 33, at 2.
91. Walsh, supra note 88, at A3.
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pressed the button that began the death process. 92 Thus, the State of Michi-
gan relied on faulty logic in order to hold Kevorkian responsible for first-
degree murder.93 Not surprisingly, six months after the murder charges
were made, they were dismissed by a judge who noted that the state of Mich-
igan had no law barring physician-assisted suicide.94
While the murder charges against Kevorkian for Miller's and Wantz's
deaths were pending, Kevorkian helped Susan Williams, a multiple sclerosis
patient, kill herself at her home in Michigan.95 Within two months of the
murder charges for Miller's and Wantz's deaths being dismissed, Dr. Kevor-
kian helped Lois F. Hawes commit suicide. 96 As in the previous cases, Dr.
Kevorkian provided Lois with a suicide machine which was activated by
Lois herself. No charges were filed by Michigan in connection with either of
these deaths. 97 The State of Michigan apparently realized that it could not
hold someone criminally responsible for an act not addressed in the state's
criminal statutes.
Thus, when Dr. Kevorkian assisted Catherine A. Andreyev, a woman suf-
fering from cancer, in ending her life in November of 1992, the Michigan
House responded by voting to make assisted suicide a felony.98 Rather than
protecting Dr. Kevorkian, Michigan's legislative response to the legal ambi-
guity over the issue of physician-assisted suicide was to pass a temporary law
which the state felt would stop Dr. Kevorkian. 99 In reaction to passage of
the bill, Dr. Kevorkian said that "[iut's essentially a bill against one person.
It's like we're still in the Dark Ages."'1° Some health professionals say that
the bill, designed to put Dr. Jack Kevorkian out of the suicide business, will
hurt their efforts to relieve the pain of terminally ill patients.' 0 These
health experts contend that doctors will be leery about withholding or with-
drawing life-sustaining treatment or giving potentially lethal pain medica-
tion in fear of prosecution for assisting a suicide. 10 2
Michigan's law is a temporary measure which expires fifteen months after
it takes effect.' 0 3 The law makes assisted suicide a felony punishable by up
to four years in prison and a $2,900 fine.1°4 The statute also establishes a
commission on death and dying, the charter of which is to study the issue of
physician-assisted suicide more thoroughly and make recommendations for
92. McCord, supra note 64, at 20.
93. See generally Victory for Dr. Death, TIME, Aug. 3, 1992, at 28.
94. Id.
95. Another Suicide Aided by Controversial Doctor, supra note 57, at C4.
96. Id.; see supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
97. Another Suicide Aided by Controversial Doctor, supra note 57, at C4.
98. Colen, supra note 57, at 17.
99. Abramowitz, supra note 48, at A2.
100. Isabel Wilkerson, Sixth Assisted Suicide Forges Michigan Bill, CHI. TRw., Nov. 26,
1992, at C6.
101. Michael Betzold, Michigan's Suicide Bill No Cure-All, CHI. TRwa., Nov. 27, 1992, at
C5.
102. Id.
103. Kevorkian Aids Ninth Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1993, at A21.
104. Id.; Abramowitz, supra note 48, at A2.
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future legislation. 10 5
The governor of Michigan signed the bill on December 16, 1992, just
hours after Dr. Kevorkian helped two more women end their own lives. 106
Two weeks before the governor signed the bill, the women appeared with
Kevorkian at a news conference criticizing the proposed law.' 0 7 "The pain I
have, I just wish... [the lawmakers] could have for one night. If I was up
on the [thirteenth] floor, I think I'd jump," said Marcella Lawrence, who
suffered from heart disease, emphysema, and a failing liver. 10 8 Marguerite
Tate, who suffered from Lou Gehrig's disease, said she too was ready to
die. 109 Both women complained of torturous pain and said that they simply
could no longer go on.110 At the conference, Dr. Kevorkian called the law
"immoral" and said he would not obey it.II The governor of Michigan
stated that if Dr. Kevorkian "does something after this law takes effect, he'll
be promptly prosecuted and I think that may be the only way this man can
be stopped."' "12
The law went into effect on March 30, 1993, and a flurry of gravely ill
people sought Dr. Kevorkian's help in dying before that date."13 Although
he had many more requests for assistance than he could possibly handle, Dr.
Kevorkian did assist a number of these individuals. These people were wor-
ried that after the law took effect Dr. Kevorkian would be unwilling to assist
them, or if held for prosecution, unable to assist them. 114 Since the ban took
effect, however, Dr. Kevorkian has continued to assist persons in ending
their lives. 15 Dr. Kevorkian has publicly acknowledged breaking the law
and asked prosecutors to charge him in order to set up a court test. ' ' 6 As of
the date of this comment, Dr. Kevorkian has been charged and is awaiting
prosecution.' 1 7 Meanwhile, the law against physician-assisted suicide is
under review by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which is not expected to
rule for many months. 18
Criticism of the Michigan law has been widespread, coming from both
individuals and powerful groups. Elmer Ferguson, a thirty-seven year old
father of three, is not dying yet.' 19 He suffers, however, from melanoma





109. Suicide Doctor Helps Two More End Lives, supra note 48.
110. Abramowitz, supra note 48, at A2.
111. Suicide Doctor Helps Two More End Lives, supra note 48.
112. Id,
113. Kevorkian Assists in Suicides of Two Elderly Cancer Victims, supra note 79, at A14.
114. Kevorkian Aids in Two More Suicides; Total is at Fifteen, supra note 79, at A10.
115. Kevorkian Faces Charge That Will Test Suicide Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug.




119. Greg Borowski, Assisted Suicide Ban Frightens Man With Cancer, Gannett News Ser-




cer may even force him to choose between "living in pain and dying in
peace." '21 Elmer could very well be a candidate-for assisted suicide one day,
and he wants to keep that option open.' 22 He fears the new law in Michigan
will take away his freedom of choice.123 "I am not [a] government issue," he
said, "I believe all this should be between you and God."' 24 Elmer may get
to the point someday where he feels that the pain is too much to handle, and
he wants to be able to make his own choices at that time.' 25 "It scares me;
we don't have freedom of choice any more," he says.' 26
Other critics of the law have said that it is too vague to withstand a judi-
cial challenge and may be inconsistent with the Supreme Court ruling re-
garding the right to die.1 27 The American Civil Liberties Union plans to
challenge the constitutionality of the law on the ground that it invades per-
sonal privacy.' 28 Critics further allege that the law was pushed through the
legislature to halt Kevorkian, who advocates public acceptance of physician-
assisted suicide. 129 The Hemlock Society, an organization which supports
aid in dying for the terminally ill, issued a statement regarding its feelings
toward the law:
The recent bill provides only a Band-Aid solution to a problem perva-
sive in the medical community. Modern medicine, while able to extend
life, has so far been unable to deal with the ethical issues arising from
that extension of life. Rather than passing laws prohibiting one physi-
cian from acting according to his conscience, the legislatures of all
states should expedite the passage of laws legalizing physician-assisted
suicide for the terminally ill, while assuring that health care and symp-
tom control are available to all.' 130
The judicial treatment of this issue in Michigan makes it clear that laws need
to be formulated that will both protect physicians from threatened prosecu-
tions that are unfounded in current state law and allow them to aid suffering
patients in ending their own lives. The laws must also include rigid guide-
lines to protect the patient from possible abuses of the practice. 131
VI. SUPPORT FOR PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
A. PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR INITIATIVES WHICH PUSH FOR ACCEPTANCE
OF PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE







127. Linda Wertheimer & Robert Siegel, hosts, National Public Radio, Dec. 16, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NPR File; see supra part IV.B.
128. Betzold, supra note 101, at C29.
129. Wertheimer & Seigel, supra note 127.
130. Hemlock Society Comments on Michigan Deaths, PR Newswire, Dec. 15, 1992, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRNews File.
131. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
1994]
SMU LAW REVIEW
aid-in-dying in November of 1991.132 The initiative asked the question:
"Shall adult patients who are in a medically terminal condition be permitted
to request and receive from a physician aid-in-dying?"' 133 The voters an-
swered no, but by a very narrow margin. 134 The initiative failed by fewer
than 100,000 of 1.3 million votes cast.' 35 Support for the initiative was
widely interpreted as "a criticism of both existing law and the inability of
many physicians to properly manage the chronic pain of terminally ill pa-
tients."' 36 Further, many physicians that voted no said that they did so
because the current proposal to provide physician aid-in-dying lacked safe-
guards for "the poor, for the depressed, for families, for people in pain, for
the mentally incompetent, for seniors, and for society.' 37 A bill with
proper safeguards is necessary to protect those patients who could be made
vulnerable by the law. The narrow margin by which the initiative was de-
feated reflects the growing attitude that physician-assisted suicide should be
legalized with proper protections.
In California, where assisted suicide is presently a felony,' 38 Proposition
161, a measure legalizing physician-assisted suicide, was on the November,
1992 ballot.139 Forty-six percent of California voters voted for the measure,
which lost by a margin of only eight percent. ' 40 Although the measure was
defeated, 4,557,037 Californians voted to give physicians the right to assist
suicides.' 4 1 Of the Californians that voted against Proposition 161, some
voted "no" because of religious reasons, while others voted "no" because
they believed the proposed law was flawed.' 42 Many doctors were con-
cerned over the wording of the measure, which said the patient's request for
death need not be witnessed. 143 The doctors feared that this wording opened
up the possibility of lawsuits against physicians in a state which already has
more litigation than any other state in America. '4
Many opponents to Proposition 161 did not feel that physician-assisted
suicide is wrong; rather, the "No on 161" supporters believed the initiative
was poorly written and invited abuse.' 45 The measure did not require a psy-
132. Blendon, supra note 14, at 2658.
133. McCord, supra note 64, at 20.
134. Blendon, supra note 14, at 2658.
135. Id.
136. Dennis L. Breo, MD-Aided Suicide Voted Down; Both Sides Say Debate to Continue,
266 JAMA 2895, 2895 (1991).
137. Id.
138. CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (Deering 1992).
139. Bruce Hilton, Nothing But Numbers, CHI. TRIB., June 10, 1992, at C7.
140. Where Now With the Euthanasia Debate?, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 17, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRNews File.
141. B.D. Colen, Euthanasia Issue Lives On, NEWSDAY, Nov. 10, 1992, at 71.
142. Derek Humphry, Death With Dignity Effort May be Tried Here Again, S.F. CHRON.,
Nov. 13, 1992, at A25; Where Now With the Euthanasia Debate?, supra note 140.
143. Michael Miller, Doctor-Assisted Suicide Measure Loses in California, REUTERS, Nov.
4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
144. Id.
145. James W. Walters, Perspective on Prop. 161; Aid in Dying is Human, Humane; Assisted
Suicide for the Terminally Ill Doesn't Conflict with Medical or Religious Interests; It Does Re-
spect Individual Rights, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1992, at MS.
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chological exam or a waiting period. 146 These provisions are necessary safe-
guards in a bill which allows physician-assisted suicide in order to prevent
abuse of the practice.147 The California initiative would have been strength-
ened by the addition of such restrictions as mental competency exams to
evaluate the decision-making abilities of the patient and a "cooling-off" pe-
riod of several days to prevent any rash decisions by patients considering
ending their lives.148 The absence of such restrictions was a flaw which pro-
moted the measure's defeat. California doctor Ronald Koons said that even
though Proposition 161 was defeated, the issue of physician-assisted suicide
is not dead: "We need to set up guidelines. It is only a question of time
before some form of doctor-assisted suicide is law."' 149
In both Washington and California, the opponents of the physician-as-
sisted suicide proposals, led by the medical establishment and the Catholic
church, "greatly outspent" the physician-assisted suicide supporters in last-
minute media blitzes. '5 0 California Proposition 161 campaign manager Jack
Nicholl said, "We simply could not match their [the opponents'] media cam-
paign.'' 5 Opponents of Proposition 161 raised $2.8 million between June
and November-the largest amounts coming from Roman Catholic diocese,
Catholic hospitals, and church-related groups-while the proponents of the
proposition raised only $215,000.152
The disproportionate campaign funding has been cited as the reason for
the defeat of the proposals. 153 Opponents of Proposition 161 ran chilling
television ads designed to scare off Californians, including those who had
generally favored the idea of physician-assisted suicide before they were
bombarded with the media blitz.' 5 4 The ads used phrases like "death by
mistake" and "no witnesses, no one will know" to sway Californians.155 The
proponents, with far less money to spend, were only able to air thirty-second
radio advertisements a few times per day.156 Voters were far more likely to
see and hear from Proposition 161's opponents than from its proponents. 157
146. Paul Jacobs & Virginia Ellis, Prop. 165 and Right-to-Die Measure Trail, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 1992, at Al.
147. What Role for Doctors in Dying?, supra note 61, at C12.
In principle, the idea of physician-assisted suicide has appeal. But in practice, it
is highly vulnerable to misuse and abuse, which the California measure does
little to combat. A prudent approach would include mandatory psychiatric ex-
aminations, a specified waiting period to avoid hasty and ill-considered deci-
sions, and a requirement that doctors counsel patients on alternatives, such as
methods of relieving severe pain.
Id.
148. Walters, supra note 145, at M5.
149. California: Health Propositions-Do They have a Future?, supra note 56.
150. Colen, supra note 57, at 17.
151. California: Health Propositions, supra note 56.
152. Paul Jacobs, Proposition 161; Outcome of Death Measure may Rest on 11th-hour Ads,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1992, at A3.
153. See California: Health Propositions, supra note 56.
154. Jacobs, supra note 152, at A3.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Colen, supra note 141, at 71.
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Despite the strong opposition from certain medical societies and a well-
funded campaign by the Roman Catholic Church, more than five million
people in Washington and California voted for reform. 15 8 This growing so-
cietal restlessness regarding the current state of physician-assisted suicide
laws is reflected across the country. Similar initiatives to those in Washing-
ton and California can already be found in at least twenty states.159 New
Hampshire legislators are currently debating a bill which would specifically
legalize assisted suicide for terminally ill patients after counseling and con-
sultation. 16° This year Connecticut and Virginia will also consider physi-
cian-assisted suicide bills. 161 Washington is planning to reintroduce an
initiative legalizing physician-assisted suicide in 1994, and Oregon is plan-
ning to introduce a similar initiative that same year. 162 Iowa and Maine are
also considering introducing referenda in the near future regarding the legal-
ization of physician-assisted suicide for dying patients. 163
The legalization efforts previously discussed indicate that the country
seems to be moving towards the formulation of laws allowing physician-as-
sisted suicide and protecting physicians from adverse legal and professional
consequences. Society's feelings on this issue are further reflected by a New
York grand jury's decision in the Dr. Timothy Quill case.164 Although New
York law makes assisted suicide a felony, 65 when a New York prosecutor
sought an indictment against the doctor, criticism of the prosecution was
widespread.' 66 Significantly, the grand jury refused to indict Dr. Quill in
spite of his confession that he intentionally aided one of his patients in end-
ing her life. 167 The grand jury's blatant disregard for the present law is an
indicator that society is calling for a change in the laws and is willing to
accept the right of suffering patients to end their lives with the aid of a pro-
fessional. A majority of Americans believe that when a terminally ill patient
is conscious and in pain, physicians should be allowed by law to respond to
that patient's request for aid in ending his or her life. 168
B. OPEN SUPPORT FROM THE MEDICAL COMMUNITY
Members of the medical community have mixed views on physician-as-
sisted suicide, but it is clear that physicians want specific formulation of poli-
cies regarding physician-assisted suicide. When Dr. Timothy Quill was
brought before a panel of his peers on an ethics charge for intentionally help-
158. Humphry, supra note 142, at A25.
159. Blendon, supra note 14, at 2658.




163. Hilton, supra note 139, at C7.
164. Blendon, supra note 14, at 2658; see supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
165. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (Consol. 1992).
166. Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 857, 859 n.l (1992).
167. Blendon, supra note 14, at 2658; Lawrence K. Altman, Jury Declines to Indict a Doc-
tor Who Said He Aided in a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1991, at Al.
168. Blendon, supra note 14, at 2660.
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ing a patient to end her life, the panel found that Dr. Quill had acted appro-
priately. 169 Dr. Quill openly confessed to the entire medical community his
role in the physician-assisted suicide, yet the panel determined that he acted
properly and should be allowed to retain his medical license.' 70 The peer
review board was clearly sending a message to the medical community and
the public that the act of physician-assisted suicide should be allowed and is
appropriate under certain circumstances. Further, when Dr. Quill was fac-
ing criminal indictment for this act, the officers and members of the Council
of the Society of General Internal Medicine wrote the District Attorney that
Dr. Quill's actions "were consistent with the range of acceptable practice of
compassionate physicians .... ",71
The support for physician-assisted suicide was furthered by an article pub-
lished by three doctors, including Dr. Quill, in a November, 1992 issue of
the New England Journal of Medicine.' 72 In the article, the doctors urged a
new public policy allowing physician-assisted suicides and listed a number of
guidelines that they believe their colleagues should follow. 173 This article is
yet another indication from the medical community that at least some of its
members are ready to allow physician-assisted suicide based on the premise
that the final decision should rest with the dying person and that this right to
choose to end one's own life is a basic civil liberty. 174
The article urges physicians and lawyers to "create public policy that fully
acknowledges irreversible suffering" for the benefit of "competent patients
who [meet].carefully defined criteria."' 75 The number of doctors who help
their patients commit suicide is estimated to be anywhere from three to
thirty-seven percent. 176 The most common method is thought to be pre-
scriptions for drugs which can end life in an easily administered overdose. 177
Dr. Quill and his co-authors say that "such hidden practices" are more risky
for patients and damage the reputation of doctors.' 78 The authors of the
article support the open practice of physician-assisted suicides, as long as
clear policies and safeguards are established and followed. 179 Dr. Quill and
his colleagues propose several tests that should be met before a doctor partic-
ipates in a suicide. First, "the patient must have a condition that is incurable
and associated with severe, unrelenting suffering ... and must understand
169. Doctors Urge Policy on Suicide Help, Cm. TRIB., Nov. 5, 1992, at C3; Suicide Assist-
ance Gains New Backing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at A32.
170. Doctors Urge Policy on Suicide Help, supra note 169, at C3.
171. Kadish, supra note 166, at 859 n.11 (quoting Letter from Robert H. Fletcher, Presi-
dent, Society of General Internal Medicine, to Charles Siragusa, District Attorney, SGIM
News (Society of General Internal Medicine) Oct. 1991, at 5).
172. Suicide Assistance Gains New Backing, supra note 169, at A32; Dr. Timothy Quill et
al., Care of the Hopelessly 1Il, 327 N. ENG. J. MED. 1380 (1992). Dr. Quill's co-authors were
Dr. Christine K. Cassel of the University of Chicago and Dr. Diane E. Meir of the Mount
Sinai School of Medicine in New York.
173. Id. at 1381; Suicide Assistance, supra note 169, at A32.
174. Humphry, supra note 142, at A25.
175. Quill, supra note 172, at 1383; see also Suicide Assistance, supra note 169, at A32.
176. Quill, supra note 172, at 1381.
177. Id. at 1382.
178. Id. at 1383.
179. Id. at 1380.
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the condition, the prognosis, and the types of comfort care available as alter-
natives."' °8 0 Second, the doctor must be sure that the "patient's suffering
and the request are not the result of inadequate comfort care." 18' Third, the
patient "must clearly and repeatedly, of his or her own free will and initia-
tive, request to die rather than continue suffering ... yet it is important not
to force the patient to 'beg' for assistance."'' 82 Fourth, the doctor "must be
sure that the patient's judgment is not distorted." 83 Fifth, the patient and
doctor who assists in the suicide should have a "meaningful doctor-patient
relationship."' 84 Sixth, a "consultation with another experienced physician
is required to ensure that the patient's request is voluntary and rational."' 85
Clear documentation showing that each condition is met would also be
required. ' 8 6
The authors say that the family members should be involved in the pro-
cess, but that "under no circumstances should the family's wishes and re-
quests override those of a competent patient."' 8 7 The authors further
stressed that if the doctor provides the medicine, the overdose should be
taken in the doctor's presence so that the patient is not abandoned at the
critical moment of his or her death.' 88 The authors of the article noted that
"terminally ill patients who do choose to take their lives often die alone so as
not to place their families or care givers in legal jeopardy."' 89 Laws al-
lowing physician-assisted suicide must not require the patient to be left alone
at the moment of death just to keep those who would agree to assist safe
from prosecution.
The fact that the New England Journal of Medicine published the article
indicates that the editors of one of the nation's premier medical journals not
only believe that the subject of physician-assisted suicide is worth exploring,
but also believe that it is "safe" to publish articles in support of the
practice. ' 90
Members of the medical community realize that these patients should not
have to die alone and without aid, and that physicians should not have to
fear repercussions if they answer a suffering patient's plea for help. The doc-
tors who authored the article realize that laws permitting physician-assisted
suicide are necessary to protect the rights of both the patient and the doctor.
180. Id. at 1381.
181. Id. at 1382.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.; Suicide Assistance, supra note 169, at A32.
185. Quill, supra note 172, at 1382.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1383.
189. Quill, supra note 172, at 1383.
190. See Colen, supra note 141, at 71.
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VII. EXPANSION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DIE
TO INCLUDE PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DIE
Any legislation created must be able to pass the hurdle of the Constitution
for it to remain good law. The constitutional right to receive assistance in
ending one's life should be recognized as an extension of the current consti-
tutional right to die which arises out of both a liberty interest found in the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution and a privacy right inherent in the
Constitution. Through both the liberty interest of persons and the privacy
right, the Supreme Court has developed a jurisprudence of autonomy. 191
This autonomy is supported by the Court's finding in the Constitution of a
fundamental right of individuals to make choices with regard to their own
bodies. 192
The Supreme Court faced the right to die issue for the first time in Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.1 93 The Court in Cruzan found
that a "competent person has a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause
in refusing unwanted medical treatment."' 194 The Court inferred this consti-
tutional right from prior Supreme Court decisions. 195 The Cruzan Court
cited recently decided cases which support the recognition of a general lib-
erty interest in refusing medical treatment. 196 In Washington v. Harper19 7
which was decided in the same term as Cruzan, the court held that "[t]he
forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's body repre-
sents a substantial interference with that person's liberty."198 The Court has
often found that such "state incursions into the body are repugnant to the
interests protected by the Due Process Clause."' 199 The Cruzan Court also
cited Vitek v. Jones,200 which held that transfer to a mental hospital coupled
with mandatory behavior modification treatment implicated liberty inter-
ests. 20 1 The Court recognized a constitutional right to refuse medical treat-
ment, arising from the general liberty interest which flows from these court
decisions involving the state's invasions into an individual's body.20 2 The
Cruzan Court assumed that this constitutionally protected right included the
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.20 3 The Cruzan Court
191. Kadish, supra note 166, at 862.
192. Id.
193. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
194. Id. at 278.
195. Id.; see, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990) (holding that under the
Due Process Clause prisoners possess a liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administra-
tion of antipsychotic drugs); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905) (balancing
an individual's liberty interest in declining an unwanted smallpox vaccine against the state's
interest in preventing disease).
196. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
197. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
198. Id. at 229.
199. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283; see, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
200. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
201. Id. at 494.
202. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
203. Id. at 279.
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noted an individual's privacy right 2° 4 but based its finding of a constitutional
right to die in the liberty interest found in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 205
An individual's right to die might also be based on the right to privacy.
The Supreme Court first recognized the right to privacy in Griswold v. Con-
necticut.20 6 In Griswold the Court found that "several fundamental constitu-
tional guarantees" created a zone of privacy for individuals. 20 7 Though the
"right of privacy" is not explicit in the text of the Constitution, the Court
found the right implicit in the First Amendment's doctrine of free thought
and association, the Third Amendment's prohibition against the required
quartering of soldiers, the Fourth Amendment's freedom from search and
seizure, the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause, the Ninth Amend-
ment's grant of unenumerated rights to the people, and the Fourteenth
Amendment's idea of personal liberty. 20 8
Although the Supreme Court based its decision in Cruzan on the Due
Process Clause, lower courts, both before and after the Cruzan decision,
have protected an individual's right to die based on a privacy right. 20 9 In In
re Quinlan 210 the New Jersey Supreme Court expanded the right to privacy
to include the right to die. 21' The Quinlan court held that a person's consti-
tutionally protected right to privacy presumably includes the right of a pa-
tient to refuse life-sustaining treatment in certain circumstances. 2 12 Since
Quinlan, most courts considering the right to die have held that patients
have a fundamental constitutional privacy right to withhold or withdraw
medical treatment and support that would prolong the dying process. 213
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ASSISTED SUICIDE
A constitutional right to die with assistance may be inferred from the
Supreme Court's recognition of a constitutional right to refuse medical treat-
ment, just as recognition of that right was inferred from prior Court hold-
ings. 2 14 Constitutional protection should extend to the third person whose
204. Id. at 271.
205. Id. at 278. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
206. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
207. Id. at 485.
208. Id. at 484; Irving R. Kaufman, Perspective on the Constitution; Would Roes's Demise
Sink Privacy?; The Modern American Conception of Freedom Includes at Least Some Inviolable
Sphere of Private Choice, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1991, at B7.
209. Kaufman, supra note 208. Laws prohibiting or impeding the choice to use contracep-
tives, have an abortion, marry one of another race, live with extended family members, and
view obscene movies within the home have all been struck down as violations of the right to
privacy. Id.
210. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
211. Id, at 663-64.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682 (Ariz. 1987); Bouvia
v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (the right to die is probably the
"ultimate" exercise of the right to privacy); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 371
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
214. See supra note 195. The idea that legalization of assisted suicide is constitutional has
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action is necessary to effectuate the exercise of that right. 21 5 Thus, the phy-
sicians who assist patients in ending their lives should be constitutionally
protected and should not have to fear criminal prosecution.
Judicial acceptance of the constitutionality of assisted suicide may well be
the logical development of the combination of judicial authorization for sub-
stituted judgment and the withdrawal of life-sustaining food and fluids from
patients who are profoundly disabled but neither terminally ill nor immi-
nently dying.21 6 State judicial decisions of the past several years increasingly
translate the right to die by refusing medical treatment into the right to die
with or without assistance. 21 7
In Bouvia v. Superior Court 2 18 the California Court of Appeals permitted
a competent, non-terminally ill patient to end her life through the refusal of
food and fluids.2 19 Elizabeth Bouvia was a patient with cerebral palsy and
quadriplegia, but she was not terminally ill nor imminently dying. The court
in Bouvia held that there was no overriding interest requiring the state to
preserve the life of a patient in the condition of Elizabeth Bouvia:
We do not believe it is the policy of this state that all and every life
must be preserved against the will of the sufferer. It is incongruous, if
not monstrous, for medical practitioners to assert their right to preserve
a life that someone else must live, or, more accurately, endure for ' 5 to
20 years.' We cannot conceive it to be the policy of this state to inflict
such an ordeal upon anyone.220
The concurring opinion of Justice Compton even more explicitly sup-
ported a right to assistance in ending one's life:
Elizabeth apparently has made a conscious and informed choice that
she prefers death to continued existence in her helpless and, to her, in-
tolerable condition. I believe she has an absolute right to effectuate that
decision. This state and the medical profession, instead of frustrating
her desire, should be attempting to relieve her suffering by permitting
and in fact assisting her to die with ease and dignity. The fact that she
is forced to suffer the ordeal of self-starvation to achieve her objective is
in itself inhumane. The right to die is an integral part of our right to
control our own destinies so long as the rights of others are not affected.
That right should, in my opinion, include the ability to enlist assistance
from others, including the medical profession, in making death as pain-
less and quick as possible. 22 1
Justice Compton's opinion recognizes the importance of allowing a patient
been strongly opposed by some. For a discussion of the unconstitutionality of assisted suicide
laws, see Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, 23 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 32, May-June 1993.
215. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 670 (N.J. 1976) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
445-46 (1972) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965)).
216. Victor G. Rosenblum & Clarke D. Forsythe, The Right to Assisted Suicide: Protection
of Autonomy Or an Open Door to Social Killing?, 6 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 13 (1990).
217. Id. at 12.
218. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
219. Id. at 298.
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to maintain his or her rights to autonomy and self-determination. Further,
he stresses that the right to die with assistance protects an individual's inter-
est in self-determination. 22 2
The Maine Supreme Court cited the principle of personal autonomy in In
Re Gardner223 when it allowed the withdrawal of food and fluids from a
person who was neither terminally ill nor imminently dying. The court al-
lowed the withdrawal based on prior statements made by the patient that he
would rather die than be maintained in a persistent vegetative state.2 24 The
court found "no reason" to disregard the patient's desire and sustain his life
when his future was so utterly helpless. 225
The Massachusetts Supreme Court allowed substituted judgment in
Guardianship of Doe when it made a determination as to whether an incom-
petent patient in a persistent vegetative state would choose, if the patient
were competent, to end life-sustaining treatment. 226 The Doe court held that
a lack of a previously-expressed intention regarding medical treatment did
not bar the use of substituted judgment.227 The court found that the quality
of the patient's life was so poor, that the state's interest in preserving life was
not sufficient to override the patient's right to refuse treatment through sub-
stituted judgment. 228
In In re Lawrance,229 the Indiana Supreme Court allowed withdrawal of
nutrition and hydration from an incompetent patient through substituted
judgment. The court held that "respect for patient autonomy does not end
when the patient becomes incompetent. " 230 The Lawrance court recognized
the right of the patient to refuse nutrition and hydration and the right of the
family of an incompetent patient to refuse it on behalf of the patient. 23'
These various court decisions have laid the groundwork for the ultimate
approval of physician-assisted suicide. 232 The courts have realized that soci-
ety's interest in the sanctity of human life can depreciate when the actual
quality of the life in question is examined. Further, in adopting substituted
judgment, courts have allowed incompetent patients to refuse medical treat-
ment regardless of whether they have previously expressed such a desire.
This substituted judgment doctrine is based on the reasoning that the pa-
tient's right to self-determination may sometimes require the assistance of
others.23 3 Substituted judgment allows patients to fulfill their desires to end
222. Id.
223. 534 A.2d 947, 951 (Me. 1987).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 954.
226. In re Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. 1992). "Substituted Judgment"
cases are those in which a person now incompetent never exercised a choice when competent.
The court seeks to determine what the person's choice would be. Kadish, supra note 166, at
878.
227. Doe, 583 N.E.2d at 1267.
228. Id. at 1269.
229. 579 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991).
230. Id. at 39.
231. Id. at 41.
232. Rosenblum, supra note 216, at 20.
233. Id. at 19.
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their lives even when they are so ill that they are unable to express these
desires themselves.
The constitutional right to refuse medical treatment should be extended to
include the right to obtain assistance in committing suicide. Little difference
exists between allowing patients to hasten their death by refusing treatment
and allowing them to do so by an act of commission with a physician's
assistance. 2 4 In fact, what is the difference between a doctor who starves
his patient to death and one who prescribes a dose of medicine and tells the
patient what dosage will result in death?23 5 Surely a reasonable person
would recognize that pulling the plug on a machine and allowing a patient to
purchase a lethal dose of morphine for self-administration should both be
considered forms of active assistance with the same end result.236 Because
the Constitution protects the withdrawal of life support, constitutional pro-
tection should also extend to physician-assisted suicide.
VIII. SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL WHO
CHOOSES TO DIE
Assisted suicide has been proposed as good public policy based on princi-
ples of autonomy and self-determination. 237 Patients request assisted suicide
because they want control over when they die, where they die, and their
physical and mental state at the time of their death. 238 When a suffering
patient requested that Dr. Timothy Quill assist her in ending her life, he
noted that "it was extraordinarily important to Diane to maintain control of
herself and her own dignity during the time remaining to her." 239 Support-
ers of legalizing assisted suicide contend that life itself is only one among a
number of goods; other goods include individual autonomy, human dignity,
physical fitness, and intellectual capabilities. 240 When life as a relative good
is compared with the other goods, suicide may become a "rational" choice if
life has become "intolerable. ' 24' "People ought to be able to be architects of
their own death," said University of Utah philosophy professor Margaret P.
Battin, who sees the choice of death or life as a "new civil right."' 24 2 Pa-
tients requesting assisted suicide have argued that their right to privacy and
self-determination are "paramount to any state interest in maintaining life"
and that there should not be a balancing of interests by the state in determin-
ing the existence of such a right. 243 In Donaldson v. Van De Kamp 244 the
234. What Role for Doctors in Dying?, supra note 61, at C12.
235. McCord, supra note 64, at 20.
236. Id.
237. See Rosenblum, supra note 216, at 20.
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ity of Euthanasia, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1992, at A20.




California Court of Appeals recognized the fundamental right of a patient to
take his own life.245 The court realized that the patient's own specific inter-
est in ending his life was more compelling than the state's abstract interest in
preserving life in general. 246 The court stated that "no state interest is com-
promised by allowing Donaldson to experience a dignified death rather than
an excruciatingly painful life."' 247 The court in Donaldson noted that the
time left in a suffering patient's life is critical and that it is a judicial weak-
ness that the court cannot accommodate the special needs of an
individual.248
Proponents of assisted suicide believe that the state should not interfere in
this final decision. 249 They argue that "choices made by rational, consenting
people in the pursuit of happiness should be acknowledged as a proper way
of asserting their liberty."'2 50 The right to die with assistance protects an
individual's interest in self-determination. 25 1 Society demonstrates "respect
for human dignity when it acknowledges the freedom [of individuals] to
make choices in accordance with their own values. '252
IX. ETHICAL PROBLEMS FOR DOCTORS
Critics of assisted suicide also fear that physicians will be corrupted by
their assistance in suicide. 253 These critics hold a distinction between assist-
ing a death and allowing a patient to die.2 54 As previously noted, however,
withdrawing medical treatment so that a person will die is an active decision
by the physician. 25 5 The physician is actually more involved in the death in
such a case than where the doctor writes a prescription for a patient and tells
the patient the lethal dosage of the medication, but leaves the ultimate death
decision to the patient. 25 6
The point to realize is that in cases of assisted suicide, the patient is the
one who makes the final decision. 25 7 The doctor should be a counselor and
assistant, but should not control the decision. 258 The patient must bear the
burden of choice and the exercise of autonomy should be his or her
responsibility. 259Critics of legalizing physician-assisted suicide also point to the traditional
oath of Hippocrates which requires physicians to promise: "To please no
one will I prescribe a deadly drug, nor give advice which may cause
245. Id. at 63.
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death.''26° Some members of the medical community, however, have real-
ized that the ability of modem medicine to prolong the dying process some-
times requires physicians to abandon "simple black-and-white rules of
conduct."' 261 One California physician who admits helping some of his pa-
tients to commit suicide contends that "the Hippocratic Oath is really not
the final word any more than the Ten Commandments. '262
X. PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE IN ANOTHER CIVILIZED
NATION
Critics of the physician-assisted suicide movement claim that tolerating
suicide would do profound harm to society. 263 One way to determine the
validity of this prediction is to examine a society that openly practices physi-
cian-assisted suicide. In the Netherlands, the practice of assisted suicide is
more open and extensive than anywhere else in the modern world.264 Dutch
health officials feel that the best control for assisted suicide is "legalization
and openness. '265
Doctors have assisted suicides for more than two decades even though
260. Jacobs, supra note 55, at Al. The medical profession has adopted The Oath of Hip-
pocrates as an ethical code. Hippocrates was a Greek physician of the period of 460 to 349
B.C. The original Oath of Hippocrates follows:
I swear by Apollo Physician, by Asclepius, by Health, by Panacea, and by all
the gods and goddesses, making them my witnesses, that I will carry out, ac-
cording to my ability and judgment, this oath and this indenture. To hold my
teacher in this art equal to my own parents; to make him partner in my liveli-
hood; when he is in need of money to share mine with him; to consider his
family as my own brothers, and to teach them this art, if they want to learn it,
without fee or indenture.
To impart precept, oral instruction, and all other instruction to my own sons,
the sons of my teacher, and to indentured pupils who have taken the physician's
oath, but to nobody else.
I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judgment, but
never with a view to injury and wrongdoing. Neither will I administer a poison
to anybody when asked to do so, nor will I suggest such a course. Similarly, I
will not give to a woman a pessary to cause abortion. But I will keep pure and
holy both my life and my art.
I will not use the knife, not even, verily, on sufferers from stone, but I will
give place to such as are craftsmen therein. Into whatsoever houses I enter, I
will enter to help the sick, and I will abstain from all intentional wrongdoing
and harm, especially from abusing the bodies of man or woman, bond or free.
And whatsoever I shall see or hear in the course of my profession, as well as
outside my profession in my intercourse with men, if it be what should not be
published abroad, I will never divulge, holding such things to be holy secrets.
Now, if I carry out this oath, and break it not, may I gain forever reputation
among all men for my life and for my art; but if I transgress it and foreswear
myself, may the opposite befall me.
CHARLES J. MCFADDEN, MEDICAL ETHICS 396, 461 (1967).
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Dutch law forbade the practice until 1993.266 In spite of the ban on assisted
suicides, however, Dutch courts have condoned physician-assisted suicide
for more than a decade and even set forth conditions that excused the doctor
from the illegal act.267 The law was seen as more of a restraint than a
prohibition. 26
In February 1993, Dutch lawmakers passed a law that allows doctors to
assist suicides under certain guidelines. 269 The measure essentially legalized
existing medical guidelines already published and sanctioned by the Royal
Dutch Medical Association. 270 Although aiding a suicide formally remains
illegal, doctors who follow the guidelines in the measure are immune from
prosecution. 27 1
The guidelines require that the patient, not his or her family, personally
request assistance, that the patient suffer from an unbearable and incurable
pain, that the patient request death repeatedly, and that the patient be in a
clear state of mind.272 The attending physician must maintain specific
records of every step in the decision-making process. Furthermore, another
physician must be in attendance to provide corroboration that the guidelines
were met.273 Once the patient has died, the doctor must submit a report to
the coroner's office.274 As long as the doctor's report shows that the guide-
lines were followed and that there is no evidence of malpractice, the doctor
will remain immune from prosecution. 275
A government report showed that 25,300 cases of assisted suicide occur
each year in Holland. 276 Further, Dutch doctors report that their colleagues
from France, Britain, Scandinavia, and elsewhere admit that they also often
intervene to assist suffering patients who request that their deaths be has-
tened. 277 The acceptance of assisted suicide has neither led to the devalua-
tion of human life nor caused the collapse of moral society in the
Netherlands. 278 Rather, the Dutch law received strong support from the
public.279 Moreover, the Dutch experience disproves the popular argument
that legitimizing physician assistance will increase the frequency of suicide
as the new legislation has not caused such a result. 280 The Dutch experience
is an important indicator that a country can accept physician-assisted suicide
and still remain a productive and moral society.
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A legal right to assisted suicide may be a logical development of the cur-
rent judicial trend allowing the withdrawal of assisted feeding from severely
disabled patients.2 81 When a physician withdraws food and fluids from a
patient, the physician starts a course of action that will inevitably cause the
death of the patient. The death, however, will take several days. This death
may or may not cause pain to the patient, but it will create a new kind of
tension on the medical personnel and family. 282 Because death is certain
and has been purposely and artificially induced, the long starvation period is
a questionable means. 283 This waiting period seems inhumane for both the
patient, the patient's family, and the medical personnel involved. It is a
cruel twist of logic to legally allow the action of withdrawal of food and
fluids in order to bring about certain death, but to prohibit more humane
actions of assisted suicide in order to hasten the direct, certain result that has
been set in motion. 284 Thus, there will be pressure on courts and legislatures
to allow physician-assisted suicides. Express legislation is necessary to pro-
tect the right of patients to choose the alternative of death with dignity
through assisted suicide and also to protect the rights of the physicians who
would assist them. With the proper safeguards, such legislation would bene-
fit many in our society by giving them control over their lives and their
deaths. Although death with dignity is not acknowledged uniformly as a
fundamental right by all states, it is at least being recognized more and more
as a humane and enlightened policy.28 5
281. Rosenblum, supra note 216, at 24. Such authorization of withdrawal of food and
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